It was Shakespeare – not William, but rather Stephan, the British
head of research firm YouGov – who first coined the drawbridge
phrase in 1995 as a reference to the threat of isolationism:
"We are either ‘drawbridge up’ or ‘drawbridge down’. Are you someone who
feels your life is being encroached upon by criminals, gypsies, spongers,
asylum-seekers, Brussels bureaucrats? Do you think the bad things will all
go away if we lock the doors? Or do you think it’s a big beautiful world
out there, full of good people, if only we could all open our arms and
embrace each other?"
PIMCO has focused on the threat of deglobalization since 2009 as part of
our New Normal and later New Neutral secular outlooks. Since the great
financial crisis, this threat has been manifest in the form of stagnant
global trade volumes and a dramatic shrinkage in the stock of cross-border
The popular backlash against the resulting subpar economic outcomes is
giving rise to “drawbridge capitalism,” a form of economic nationalism that
seeks to reclaim the spoils of globalization. This goes beyond, potentially
far beyond, mere skepticism of the fruits of globalization. With the UK’s
vote to leave the European Union and the U.S. election of Donald Trump as
president, a political economy mix normally confined to emerging markets
has come mainstream. Inevitably, the rise of drawbridge capitalism will
make the world more insecure and potentially less stable.
No matter the perceived villain, the trend toward drawbridge policies
reflects a nationalistic desire to regain control of borders, regulation
and economic policy, and by extension to reap the benefits of sharing less.
Local firms are protected at the expense of foreign firms; immigration
controls aim to shield domestic workers; and companies are incentivized to
invest domestically. Fiscal policy is loosened to support these
initiatives. If the retreat from globalization has been relatively passive
to date, drawbridge capitalism actively accelerates the withdrawal.
The market consequences of this acceleration are likely to be a more
explicit link between geopolitical and commercial relationships; the return
of pronounced currency volatility; and greater tension at all levels
between China, the world’s largest producer, and the U.S., the largest
The U.S. is at the epicenter of drawbridge capitalism. A retreat from its
voluntary international commitments now looks inevitable. Future “security
rental arrangements” should entail a more explicit link between commercial
benefits and the provision of security services.
Still, U.S. demobilization from its global responsibilities will likely
happen gradually in favor of a new foreign policy revolving around
counterterrorism strategy and protection of borders. This should have the
immediate effect of forcing traditional beneficiaries, namely those in
Europe and Asia, to spend more on security. Within Europe, it would
reinforce an evacuation at the national level from the political center
toward the extremes. In Asia, to the extent that China can expand its
regional political influence, the rest of the region is likely to become
more financially linked to China. At the same time, the goal of fighting
radical Islam will work in favor of improving U.S. relations with Russia.
U.S. retrenchment will also tend to leave a void in areas where the U.S.
has acted as a guarantor of stability. How these voids are filled is
arguably a more consequential concern than whether the U.S. Treasury names
China a currency manipulator. Tensions around North Korea and Taiwan are
likely to pose early tests for the Trump administration, raising the
political risk premium on Asian assets.
Renegotiating trade agreements is central to President Trump’s reshoring
priorities. One of his first acts as president has been to withdraw from
the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement with Asia. Even if the
threats to China and Mexico tend more toward nationalist bark than populist
bite, markets are prone to react first and ask questions later.
The Mexican peso’s depreciation to levels not seen (in real terms) since
the 1994 Tequila Crisis is a case in point. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) is not likely to be scrapped altogether. Mexican-sourced
goods are simply too important of an input to U.S. value chains. But the
popular reaction to Trump’s policies increases the chances of a leftist
victory in the 2018 Mexican presidential election. Threats and rhetoric can
carry lasting costs to stability.
The rise of drawbridge capitalism has broad global ramifications.
Despite its reflationary promises, the proliferation of drawbridge
capitalism creates a financial bias for safety, borne of a stronger dollar,
greater geopolitical and trade uncertainties and rising pressure on China.
The unconditional lowering of drawbridges over the past 30 years drove a
surge in cross-border capital flows predicated on diversification benefits.
Trade agreements helped spawn the convergence to low and less volatile
interest rates globally. What follows under drawbridge capitalist policies
can prompt sharp retrenchment in cross-border capital flows, particularly
from emerging markets. Rising trade and geopolitical uncertainties mark a
natural convergence between deglobalization and economic nationalism.
Gene Frieda is a PIMCO global strategist based in London.
All investments contain risk and may lose value. Investors should consult their investment professional prior to making an investment decision.
This material contains the opinions of the manager and such opinions are subject to change without notice. This material has been distributed for informational purposes only and should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission. PIMCO is a trademark of Allianz Asset Management of America L.P. in the United States and throughout the world. ©2017, PIMCO.
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